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INTRODUCTION
Although presumption of innocence is widely recognized as a
fundamental principle of criminal and constitutional law, its
implications are disputed. This article considers the role of
presumption of innocence in administrative proceedings concerning
the removal or suspension of criminally indicted public officeholders.
Furthermore, the article considers whether a person charged with
criminal offenses should be tasked with forming a government.
In Bell v. Wolfish, the United States Supreme Court applied a
narrow interpretation of the presumption of innocence, which is
essentially a reflection of the prosecution’s burden to prove guilt
175
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beyond a reasonable doubt. 1 This article assumes a broad view of the
presumption of innocence and its application beyond establishing the
burden of proof in a criminal trial. This article also is inspired by the
holding of the Israeli Supreme Court regarding the possibility of
assigning Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, of the outgoing
government, with the task of forming a government.
In May 2020, the Israeli Supreme Court 2 addressed whether the
task of forming a government in Israel could be allowed for Benjamin
Netanyahu, the prime minister of the outgoing government,
considering he was facing prosecution for corruption charges,
including one count of bribery and two counts of fraud and breach of
trust. 3 During 2019 and 2020, three successive elections were held in
Israel. 4 In the first two elections, neither Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu nor his then chief political rival, Benny Gantz, the head of
the Blue and White faction, were able to form a majority coalition that
received the support of most Knesset Members (Israel’s parliament). 5
Consequently, Benjamin Netanyahu served as the prime minister of
the outgoing government during this period.
The third elections took place about a month after Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu was indicted on bribery, fraud, and breach of

* Professor of Law, Zefat Academic College, Israel. The author thanks Jayden
Kitai-Sangero, Boaz Sangero, and Daisy Mendez for their helpful comments.
1. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979). See also United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (ignoring the effect of the presumption of
innocence on preventive detention).
2. The Israeli Supreme Court was sitting as the High Court of Justice, which
hears petitions as the first and sole instance. See About the Supreme Court, THE
STATE OF ISRAEL, THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITY SUPREME COURT,
https://supreme.court.gov.il/sites/en/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited Nov. 22,
2021).
3. Benjamin Netanyahu: What are the Corruption charges?, BBC NEWS (May
22, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-47409739.
4. The elections were held on April 2019, September 2019, and March 2020.
Dan Williams & Stephen Farrell, Explainer: Why is Israel holding its third election
in a year?, REUTERS (Feb. 29, 2020, 11:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usisrael-election-explainer/explainer-why-is-israel-holding-its-third-election-in-a-yearidUSKBN20O1FL.
5. Id.
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trust. 6 Despite the indictment, the prime minister’s political party, the
Likud, received a majority vote. 7 It was Benny Gantz, however, who
won the most recommendations from Knesset Members and was
granted the mandate to form a government by the President. 8 After
Gantz failed to secure a majority coalition, the President shifted this
task to the Knesset. 9 For the following twenty-one days, the majority
of the Knesset members had the power to request the President to
assign the mandate of forming a government to a particular Knesset
Member. 10 In the shadow of the Coronavirus pandemic, the Blue and
White faction decided to join forces with the Likud faction in order to
end the political deadlock and establish a government of national
unity. 11 The coalition agreement signed between the two parties
stipulated that during the first eighteen months of the government’s
term, Benjamin Netanyahu would serve as the prime minister and
Benny Gantz as deputy prime minister. 12 Gantz and Netanyahu would
then exchange positions for the eighteen months that followed. 13
After the coalition agreement was signed and the majority of
Knesset Members recommended Benjamin Netanyahu with the task of
forming a government, petitions were filed with the Supreme Court
6. Id. No statute in Israel bars the indictment of a sitting Prime Minister. In
contrast, the President of the United States is not subject to prosecution during his or
her term in office. Cass R. Sunstein, Impeaching the President, 147 U. PA. L. REV.
279, 280 (1998); Akhil Reed Amar, On Impeaching Presidents, 28 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 291, 292 (1999); W. Burlette Carter, Can a Sitting President Be Federally
Prosecuted? The Founders’ Answer, 62 HOW. L.J. 331, 339 (2019).
7. Raoul Wootliff, Final Results Show Likud with 36 Seats, Netanyahu Bloc
Short of Majority with 58, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Mar. 5, 2020, 7:02 PM),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/final-results-confirm-likud-with-36-seats-right-shortof-majority-with-58/.
8. Mark Weiss, Gantz Gets Mandate to Form Israel’s Government, THE IRISH
TIMES (Mar. 16, 2020, 18:21), https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/middleeast/gantz-gets-mandate-to-form-israel-s-government-1.4204467.
9. Id.
10. Raoul Wootliff, Rivlin Gives Knesset 21 Days to Agree on the PM it
Wants, or Go to New Election, THE TIMES OF ISRAEL (Apr. 16, 2020, 11:39 AM),
https://www.timesofisrael.com/rivlin-sends-mandate-to-knesset-starting-21-dayclock-on-possible-new-election/.
11. Weiss, supra note 8.
12. Israel’s Netanyahu and Gantz Sign Unity Government Deal, BBC NEWS
(Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-52358479.
13. Id.
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arguing that a person accused of criminal offenses involving moral
turpitude was not eligible to serve as prime minister. 14
With no precedent or law regarding this issue, 15 the Israeli
Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the petitions, finding no legal
ground to disqualify an indicted individual from forming a
government. 16 Although the Supreme Court refrained from
intervening with the decision of the Knesset, and though the Justices
diverged over the lege ferenda, 17 some Justices have not tried to hide
their dissatisfaction over their verdict from a moral standpoint. In the
supplementary judgment, Chief Justice Esther Hayut concurred with
some of her colleagues regarding the need for legislation that regulates
the ability to impose the task of forming the government on a person
indicted with serious offenses involving moral turpitude. 18
However, The Israeli Supreme Court recalled its previous
holdings, which distinguished between the treatment of defendants by
the criminal law and their treatment within the framework of
administrative law. 19 Previous precedent addressed the removal from
office of a minister and a deputy minister indicted on serious
offenses. 20 The Court also discussed the striking down of the decision
14. Israel: Supreme Court Again Rejects Petition for Court to Rule on
Indicted Knesset Member’s Eligibility for Prime Ministership, LIBR. OF CONG. (Apr.
20,
2020),
https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2020-04-20/israelsupreme-court-again-rejects-petition-for-court-to-rule-on-indicted-knesset-memberseligibility-for-prime-ministership/.
15. The law only ordered ineligibility of a sitting Prime Minister after a final
conviction. Basic Law: The Government, § 18(d), (2001) (as adopted) (Isr.).
16. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney
General §§ 6, 19 (May 12, 2020), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.).
17. “A Latin expression that means “future law” used in the sense of “what
the law should be.”
18. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney
General (Supplementary Judgment) (May 27, 2020), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
19. Israel: Supreme Court Again Rejects Petition for Court to Rule on
Indicted Knesset Member’s Eligibility for Prime Ministership, supra note 14.
20. HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. State of
Israel 47(5) PD 404 (1993) (Isr.); HJC 4267/93, Amitai – Citizens for Proper and
Clean Governance v. The Prime Minister of Israel 47(5) PD 441 (1993) (Isr.); HCJ
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of the city councils to avoid the removal of indicted mayors of two
municipalities from office. 21
In 1993, the Minister of Interior was charged with bribery and
additional offenses involving exploitation of his office. 22 The Interior
Minister refused to resign and the prime minister at the time, Yitzhak
Rabin, refrained from terminating his tenure of office. 23 The Israeli
Supreme Court ordered the prime minister to remove the Minister
from his office, stating that refraining from exercising that power was
extremely unreasonable. 24
In 2013, contrary to the dissenting opinion of former Chief Justice
Grunis who argued that the majority’s decision gave no sufficient
weight to the presumption of innocence, the Supreme Court ruled that
indicted individuals are ineligible to be mayors, and therefore, city
councils must remove the indicted mayors from office. 25 According to
Israeli law, a city council can remove a head of authority if it is
convinced they have committed conduct unbecoming of a head of
authority and is, therefore, unfit to serve in office. 26 The Court found
the city councils’ decision not to exercise this power to be extremely
unreasonable due to its inconsistency with the principles of
maintaining clean governance and of the rule of law. 27 The Court
further clarified that if a mayor is removed from office and
subsequently reelected (which ultimately indeed happened), the city

1993/03 The Movement for Quality of Government in Israel v. Prime Minister, Mr.
Ariel Sharon 57(6) PD 817 (2003) (Isr.).
21. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135 (2013) (Isr.).
22. HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. State of
Israel 47(5) PD 404 (1993) (Isr.).
23. Id.
24. Id. See Ariel L. Bendor, Investigating the Executive Branch in Israel and
in the United States: Politics as Law, the Politics of Law, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 193,
220-21 (2000), for a discussion on the unreasonableness ground for judicial review
of administrative decisions in Israel.
25. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135 (2013) (Isr.).
26. Local Authorities (Election and Tenure of Head and Deputy Heads) Law,
5735-1975, § 22(a) (Isr.).
27. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135, § 7(2)
(2013) (Isr.).
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council is obligated to convene soon after the election to decide
whether the mayor ought to be removed from office. 28
Thus, according to the Israeli Supreme Court, filing criminal
charges involving moral turpitude against public officeholders
requires removal from their position. The judicial removal mechanism
of indicted public officeholders without a criminal conviction, and
against the will of their superiors or the voters, is unique to Israel. 29
No wonder, then, that Justice Amit critically described the anomalous
result created according to which indicted officials who are ineligible
to hold lesser public offices can still serve as prime minister. 30
Nevertheless, the Israeli Supreme Court did not find its previous
rulings fitting precedent when it considered the case of Benjamin
Netanyahu. The Court deferred to the Knesset’s decision and refrained
from circumventing the outcomes of the democratic process. 31 The
Court emphasized that the issue at hand was the exercise of the
Knesset Members’ discretion to ask the President of the State to
assign the task of forming a government to Benjamin Netanyahu. 32
Such a decision has wide political implications that lie at the heart of
28. Id.
29. Bendor, supra note 24, at 224-25. See also Yoav Dotan, Impeachment by
Judicial Review: Israel’s Odd System of Checks and Balances, 19 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. 705, 708 (2018). But cf U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4, providing that “(t)he
President, Vice President and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed
from office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.” See also Elana Cunningham Willis, Constitutional
Crisis: Can the Governor (or Other State Officeholder) Be Removed from Office in
a Court Action after being Convicted of a Felony, 50 ARK. L. REV. 221, 235 (1997)
(stating that “(o)f course, prior to conviction, the only method of removal of a state
officer would be by impeachment. Indeed, no one could seriously argue that under
our state constitution a sitting governor or other state officer could be legally
removed from office for criminal conduct through judicial proceedings absent any
adjudication of guilt by a court.”).
30. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney
General (Supplementary Judgment) § 4-5 (May 27, 2020), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
31. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135 (2013) (Isr.).
32. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney
General §15 (May 12, 2020), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.).
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the democratic process. 33 According to the Court, intervening in the
Knesset’s political decisions is limited to only exceptional
circumstances, which this case did not fall within. 34
The Supreme Court could have also considered the political
repercussions of disqualifying Benjamin Netanyahu when no other
candidate to the tenure of prime minister gained the majority support
of the Knesset. Disqualifying Benjamin Netanyahu would have forced
Israel to hold a fourth election during a global pandemic and deepen
the political chaos. However, at that point in time, the Court could not
have predicted that the coalition would last just seven months and that
Israel would face a fourth election soon thereafter. 35
Chief Justice Hayut stressed that the Supreme Court’s ruling does
not lighten the severity of the pending charges against Netanyahu or
the difficulty derived from the tenure of a prime minister indicted on
charges of corruption. 36 But the presumption of innocence, according
to Chief Justice Hayat, still applies to Netanyahu. 37
In contrast, Justices Amit and Barak-Erez believe that the
presumption of innocence is irrelevant to the question posed.38
According to them, while the presumption of innocence provides
protection to a criminal defendant, it is not applicable in
administrative law. 39 An indictment reflects the prima facie evidence
33. Id. at § 16.
34. Id. at § 17 (emphasis added).
35. The fourth election occurred on March 23, 2021, when Benjamin
Netanyahu’s tenure as prime minister ended. The largest party, the Likud, won 30
out of 120 seats in the Knesset, but was unable to successfully form a government.
The second largest party, Yesh Atid, which received 17 seats, managed to do so.
Yesh Atid permitted the leader of a party called Yamina, which received only 7
seats, serve as the prime minister for the next two years. Afterwards, the leader of
Yesh Atid is intended to take his place as prime minister. Dr. Fattouh Heikal et al.,
Analyzing Israeli Elections: Four Polls in Two Years Fail to Fix Political Imbroglio,
TRENDS (Mar. 31, 2021), https://trendsresearch.org/insight/analyzing-israelielections-four-polls-in-two-years-fail-to-fix-political-imbroglio/.
36. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney
General § 19 (May 12, 2020), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew)
(Isr.).
37. Id.
38. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney
General (Supplementary Judgment) § 10 (Amit, J.), § 3 (Barak-Erez, J.) (May 27,
2020), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
39. Id.
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collected by the prosecution, and thus, constitutes a strong piece of
evidence in administrative court. 40 The indictment carries serious
weight in the case of Benjamin Netanyahu given its scrutiny by
dozens of senior prosecutors, including the Attorney General, who
took into account public sensitivity and the far-reaching repercussions
of filing an indictment against a sitting prime minister. 41
In other countries and under certain circumstances, administrative
agencies are authorized to suspend or remove an officeholder 42 and
can make decisions that ultimately violate their constitutional rights.43
Reputational damage can be one of the harsh consequences that
accompany criminal proceedings. 44 Oftentimes, this harm may be
irreversible and more detrimental than the criminal punishment itself.
Reputational damage deprives a person of ‘liberty’ within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment, for a person’s most precious liberty is their
right to work. When a person is deprived of that ‘liberty’ without a
fair trial, they are denied due process. 45 Reputational damage can also
impair someone’s dignity and self-confidence. Additionally, the
40. Every person accused of a felony (in Israel felony is an offense which
carries a penalty of more than three years imprisonment) is entitled to a hearing
before making a decision regarding the filing of indictment. Criminal Procedure
Law, 5742-1982, § 60A (1982) (consolidated version) (Isr.).
41. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. Attorney
General (Supplementary Judgment) § 10 (Amit, J.), § 3 (Barak-Erez, J.) (May 27,
2020), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
42. See, e.g., LOUS. CONST. art. X, Part I, § 5 (“A member of the state or of a
city civil service commission may be removed by the governor or the governing
authority, as the case may be, for cause, after being served with written
specifications of the charges against him and being afforded an opportunity for a
public hearing thereon by the appointing authority.”).
43. See also Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 41-42 (2006) (“Under normal due process rules, loss of a
government entitlement (such as government employment, or eligibility for
government contract awards) gives rise to the due process right to notice and a
hearing, even with respect to interim steps such as suspension. But when suspension
is sought on the ground that a government employee or government contractor has
been indicted, the same due process rules do not apply.”).
44. See e.g., Jeff Thaler, Punishing the Innocent: The Need for Due Process
and the Presumption of Innocence Prior to Trial, 44 WIS. L. REV. 441, 452-453
(1978).
45. Max Rosenn, Presumed Guilty, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 535, 546 (1995).
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removal of officeholders from their position based on their status as
criminal defendants may stigmatize them as criminals in the eyes of
the public. 46 This is particularly apparent when their case attracts
mass media coverage. An officeholder’s alleged unfitness to hold
public office may accompany them even after they’ve been acquitted.
This article proceeds as follows: Section I considers several
arguments denying the applicability of the presumption of innocence
to public officeholder proceedings. In contrast, Section II examines
the protection that the presumption of innocence provides in these
proceedings. Section III attempts to strike a balance between the
competing arguments and examines whether there are circumstances
that justify the removal of indicted public officeholders from their
position. This article concludes that the presumption of innocence
should apply to indicted public officeholders during proceedings
concerning their fitness to hold public office. The presumption of
innocence should not be violated, especially when the officeholders
have wide support from their superiors or the public at large to
continue in office.
I. DENYING THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

A. General
Many international treaties and laws in various countries only
apply the presumption of innocence to criminal proceedings. For
instance, Article 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms applies the presumption of innocence to
“everyone charged with a criminal offence.” 47 Section 11 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms restricts the presumption of
innocence to proceedings in “criminal and penal matters.” 48 This
narrow approach to the presumption of innocence, which has also

46. Id. at 537. See also JAMES C. MORTON & SCOTT C. HUTCHISON, THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 62-63 (1987).
47. European Convention of Human Rights, art. 6(2), (2021), https://www
.echr.coe.int/documents/convention_eng.pdf.
48. Guide to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, GOVERNMENT OF
CANADA, https://www.canada.ca/en/canadian-heritage/services/how-rights-protected
/guide-canadian-charter-rights-freedoms.html#a2e5 (last modified June 08, 2020).
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been adopted by the United States Supreme Court, 49 generally limits
the applicability of the presumption of innocence to criminal trials. By
contrast, the broad approach recognizes its applicability to pre-trial
proceedings and believes the presumption of innocence should “serve
as a key component in [all] decisions detrimentally affecting the
accused’s rights.” 50
Exploring the debate between the narrow approach and the broad
approach to the presumption of innocence is beyond the scope of this
article. As previously explained, this article will proceed following the
broad approach and its applicability beyond criminal proceedings.
There are several arguments, however, that support limiting the
presumption of innocence to criminal proceedings alone. According to
these arguments, which are examined below, the presumption of
innocence does not extend to administrative law and cannot bind
administrative agencies in making decisions regarding removal or
suspension from office.
B. Managerial Prerogatives
One argument against the application of the presumption of
innocence to administrative proceedings derives from a labor law
perspective. Generally, an employer has the prerogative to dismiss
employees for reasons unrelated to their status as accused, such as
poor work performance, bad human relations, lack of credibility or
loyalty, and even disagreement on policy matters. 51 But it may occur
that indicted officeholders may not be able to devote their attention to
the fulfillment of their public obligations due to the nature of the
criminal proceedings.
Indeed, the employer’s prerogative may still be subject to
requirements of substantive fairness, such as the inability to dismiss
employees on account of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation,
49. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979) (“The presumption of
innocence is a doctrine that allocates the burden of proof in criminal trials…”).
50. Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 259 (2002)
(emphasis added).
51. Eric R. Daleo, The Scope and Limits of the New Jersey Governor’s
Authority to Remove the Attorney General and Others for Cause, 39 RUTGERS L.J.
393, 434 (2008).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol52/iss1/6

10

Kitai-Sangero: The Israeli Case for the Applicability of the Presumption of Inno

2021]

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

185

age, and disability. 52 Generally, employers cannot fire employees atwill but rather “for cause” subject to certain procedural
requirements. 53 Nonetheless, these requirements do not preclude the
removal of officeholders from their positions when appropriate. Thus,
the employer may distrust the employee because of the criminal
charges against them, even if the charges do not influence their job
performance. Arguably, then, the presumption of innocence is
irrelevant in employment settings and cannot limit the employer’s
power to dismiss an employee based on charges against them.
The procedural requirements of substantive fairness are clearly
irrelevant to the Israeli Supreme Court who forced the recalcitrant
prime minister to remove the indicted Minister of Interior from his
position. 54 People and organizations purporting to represent the public
interest, not by the officeholders who were affected by these
administrative decisions, sought judicial review. 55
Employer prerogative (to dismiss employees) is especially
irrelevant when an indicted individual has been tasked with forming
the government. Here, the “employer” is represented by the Knesset
Members who reflect the people’s will. Most Knesset Members
expressed their preference of a broad unity government under the
leadership of both Benjamin Netanyahu and Benny Gantz. 56 The
52. Rebecca Michaels, Legitimate Reasons for Firing: Must They Honestly be
Reasonable, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2643, 2647 (2003); See also Bostock v. Clayton
County, Ga., 590 U.S. 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1754 (2020) (“an employer who fires an
individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.”).
53. See, e.g., Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 535541 (1985) (discussing the removal and required procedures for “classified civil
servants.”); Daleo, supra note 51, at 433, 439-54 (discussing “for cause” removal
powers in respect to public officials); Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29
(1997). See Martin H. Redish & Kristin McCall, Due Process, Free Expression, and
the Administrative State, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 297, 312 (2018), for the
applicability of procedural fairness to administrative adjudications.
54. Bendor, supra note 24, at 195 n.3 (emphasis added). The Court has also
forced city councils to remove mayors from office against their will. Dotan, supra
note 29, at 731.
55. The Israeli Supreme Court has removed officeholders from their positions
through judicial review. See generally Dotan, supra note 29.
56. Steve Hendrix, Netanyahu Fails to Form New Israeli Government; Rival
Gantz Poised to Take Up the Challenge, THE WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/netanyahu-fails-to-form-newisraeli-government-rival-gantz-poised-to-take-up-thechallenge/2019/10/21/7a4574d4-e27e-11e9-be96-6adb81821e90_story.html.
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Knesset Members should have also considered the ability of Benjamin
Netanyahu to perform his public duties while facing trial.
C. Loss of Position Does Not Constitute Punishment
Another argument is that because removal from office, despite its
harsh consequences, is not a punishment, officeholders in
administrative proceedings do not need the same protections as
criminal defendants. 57
The primary purpose of the administrative proceedings is not to
punish officeholders for the commission of offenses, but rather to
examine their ability to occupy a certain position, protect the proper
functioning and the integrity of the civil service, protect the public at
large, and promote public trust in the civil service. 58 The states’
compelling interest in maintaining the integrity of the civil service is
undisputed. Israeli Justice Edna Arbel stressed that despite the
importance of the presumption of innocence, “…the fact that the
criminal proceeding has yet to be concluded does not allow for
ignoring it on the public level, and does not allow treating the
defendant as if clean of all wrongdoing, when candidacy for public
office is at stake or when the continuation of their service is
examined.” 59 This distinction between punishment and removal (or
suspension) from office is valid despite the reputational harm that may
occur or the fact that the officeholder may nonetheless view it as
punishment. 60
Indeed, the Canadian Supreme Court, for instance, ruled that
while the presumption of innocence is available to persons prosecuted
by the State who face true punitive sanctions, such as imprisonment or
57. See generally Gus Kodellas v. Saskatchewan Hum. Rts, Comm’n (1986) 8
C.H.R.R. 29325, 29381 (Can.) (citing MacBain v. Canadian Hum. Rts. Comm’n
(1984) 11 D.L.R. (4th) 202, 212 (Can.)).
58. Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1883). See also Re Trumbley and
Fleming (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 570, 589 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Re Barry v. Alberta
Comm’n Securities (1986), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 730, 736 (Can. Alta. Q.B.).
59. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Admin. and Soc. Just. v. Rochberger,
66(3) PD 135, 5 (2013) (Isr.).
60. Re Barry v. Alberta Comm’n Securities (1986), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 730, 736
(Can. Alta. Q.B.).
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fine, even if the matter is not characterized as criminal, it has no
applicability outside the criminal or quasi-criminal context. 61 Also, the
European Court has established criteria for labeling a charge as
“criminal,” which affects how the offense is classified under domestic
law and the nature and severity of the penalty imposed. 62
The problem with this approach is that it focuses only on the
purpose and intent of the administrative proceedings, while ignoring
other consequences and their substantial impact to the indicted
individual. 63 Undoubtedly, certain individuals would prefer penal
sanctions over removal from office. 64
Indeed, removal or suspension from office is certainly not classic
criminal penalties like imprisonment or fine. Nonetheless, they do
involve a deprivation of property interest. These proceedings aim to
maintain the integrity and functioning of the civil service rather than
to achieve punishment, retribution, or deterrence. 65
Nevertheless, the broad view considers the presumption of
innocence a defense against pretrial punishment and a defense against
violating the basic rights of accused individuals out of a supposition of
guilt. 66 This broad view, then, purports to also protect public
officeholders during the administrative proceedings regarding their
removal from office.

61. Roger R. Wigglesworth v. Her Majesty the Queen & the Att’y Gen. et al.,
[1987] S.C.R. 541, 554-555 (Can.).
62. The three criteria to consider when deciding whether a person was
charged with a criminal office are: the classification of the offense under national
law, the nature of the offense, and the nature and degree of severity of the penalty
imposed. A.P., M.P., and T.P. v. Switz., 28 Eur. Ct. H.R. 313, § 39 (1997).
63. MORTON & HUTCHISON, supra note 46, at 40. See also Ex parte Wall, 107
U.S. 265, 318 (1883) (Field J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]o disbar an attorney is to
inflict upon him a punishment of the severest character”).
64. Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited: Fewer Eggs in
the Basket?, 44 CATH. U. L. REV. 363, 364 (1995) (discussing the procedural
protections private businesses have achieved against punitive actions).
65. See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963)
(describing the distinction between civil and criminal sanctions).
66. See Kitai, supra note 50, at 287-88; Una Ni Raifeartaigh, Reconciling Bail
Law with the Presumption of Innocence, 17 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 18 (1997).
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D. The Unique Characteristics of the Administrative Decision
There are significant differences between the rules and procedures
that govern administrative decisions and the rules and procedures of
criminal law. The latter does not comport with the aims of
administrative decisions, and applying the presumption of innocence
when addressing the removal of public officeholders from their
positions may compel agencies to adhere to such rules.
Although administrative agencies are less experienced than
judicial courts in evaluating evidence, they must nonetheless abide by
the rules of natural justice. 67 Unlike the judiciary, administrative
agencies are not subject to the strict procedural and evidentiary
standards of criminal law and procedural fairness. 68 When evaluating
evidence, administrative agencies cannot (and should not) grant
officeholders the full panoply of constitutional guarantees afforded to
criminal defendants, such as the right to cross-examine the
prosecution’s witnesses. 69 The administrative agency can rely only on
substantial evidence, whose probative weight may fall short of the
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard required to establish guilt in
criminal trials. 70 In administrative proceedings, accused persons are
also granted less safeguards and are denied a full opportunity to refute
the incriminating evidence against them. 71 In this context, the duty of
67. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (holding that at
minimum, students facing suspension must be given some kind of notice and be
afforded some kind of hearing). See also Richard Steinecke & Donald Posluns,
Professional Misconduct Proceedings, 9 ADVOC. Q. 160, 162-163 (1988)
(discussing professional misconduct proceedings).
68. Milton A. Kallis, Constitutional Limitations on Administrative Agencies, 1
CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT 397, 402 (1935) (nothing that “…an administrative body
can prescribe its own rules of procedure and is not bound by the technical common
law rules of evidence which were brought into operation because of a jury of
laymen.”).
69. E.g.. Engel et al. v. Neth., App. No. 5100/71, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 647, ¶ 80
(1976) (“Disciplinary sentences … do not appear in the person’s criminal record and
entail more limited consequences.” “…criminal proceedings are ordinarily
accompanied by fuller guarantees.”).
70 Dotan, supra note 29, at 733.
71. Jamey Holmes, Is the Federal Aviation Administration Kicking the Dog:
Pilot Disciplinary Proceedings and the Self-Incrimination Privilege, 57 J. AIR L. &
COM. 297, 297, 299 (1991).
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fairness is sacrificed to some extent for the sake of efficiency and
promptness.
According to the concept that distinguishes between “guilt”
concerning the professional aspects of the officeholder’s conduct, and
“guilt” in a criminal conviction, there is no impediment to dismiss or
suspend an officeholder from civil service even following an acquittal
in a criminal trial or with the absence of an indictment. 72 Thus, even
non-criminal conduct, such as neglect of duty or unprofessional
conduct, can be the subject of disciplinary proceedings. 73
Based on the distinction between the standards of guilt in criminal
and administrative cases, the presumption of innocence could apply to
administrative decisions but could also be refuted based on the lower
burden of proof, which does not suffice in a criminal conviction.74
Thus, when ordering the removal of a Deputy Minister indicted on
offenses, the Israeli Supreme Court clarified that the presumption of
innocence does not bar terminating the service of an officeholder
based on reasonable administrative evidence. 75 Accordingly, the Court
held:
There is no conflict between the presumption of innocence in
criminal proceedings and the administrative finding, on the basis of
administrative evidence, that one was involved in criminal activity.
This administrative evidence does not constitute a conviction. It
does not turn an innocent person into a convicted one. However,
such evidence may lead, in the right circumstances, to an

72. Re Barry v. Alberta Comm’n Securities (1986), 25 D.L.R. (4th) 730, 736
(Can. Alta. Q.B.) (stating that there is no impediment to disciplinary prosecution
after the criminal procedure is revoked due to statute of limitations). See also Ex
parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 287 (1883) (no indictment has been filed due to the
reluctance of the witness to testify against the suspect).
73 Holmes, supra note 71, at 297.
74. See HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.
Attorney General § 10 (Amit, J.) (May 12, 2020), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (stating that Knesset Member Netanyahu enjoys the
presumption of innocence. It is assumed that he did not commit the offenses.
However, an indictment was filed after holding a hearing by the Attorney General
and consequently, there is at least administrative evidence to the commission of the
offenses).
75. HJC 4267/93, Amitai – Citizens for Proper and Clean Governance v. The
Prime Minister of Israel 47(5) PD 441, 468 (1993) (Isr.)
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administrative conclusion against the continued service of an
elected public official. 76

The Israeli Supreme Court proceeded from the assumption that
the very indictment, which, as stated, reflects the prima facie evidence
collected by the prosecution, is sufficient for the removal of public
officeholders from their office. 77 Similarly, the United States Supreme
Court held that for purposes of detention, the decision of the grand
jury to indict conclusively establishes the existence of probable
cause, 78 and that such a decision also suffices for suspension. 79 The
United States Supreme Court has also held that an arrest of an
employee on felony drug charges creates a reasonable belief that they
committed a crime, which satisfies due process protections from
suspension without pay. 80
Indeed, administrative agencies are not required to follow formal
procedural and evidentiary rules. However, though an indictment
requires probable cause, 81 or probability of conviction that is greater
than the probability of acquittal, 82 when indictment in serious crimes
is sufficient to remove officeholders from their position, the evidence

76. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135, §38 (2013)
(Isr.) (Naor, J.). The possible divergence between the criminal and administrative
proceedings regarding the presumption of innocence may coincide with Diff’s
theory. See Antony Duff, Who Must Presume Whom to Be Innocent of What, 42
NETH. J. LEGAL. PHIL. 170, 171 (2013).
77. HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. State of
Israel 47(5) PD 404, § 18 (1993) (Isr.).
78. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 118 (1975).
79. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241 (1988).
80. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 934 (1997) (“A grand jury indictment
provides adequate assurance that the suspension is not unjustified.”). A grand jury’s
determination of probable cause to believe that the employee has committed a felony
justifies a brief suspension of an indicted official of a federally insured bank before
holding a hearing. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230,
241 (1988).
81. U.S. v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); William Ortman, Probable
Cause Revisited, 68 STAN. L. REV. 511, 547 (2016).
82. ANDREW ASHWORTH, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: AN EVALUATIVE STUDY
163 (1994).
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is assumed to be compelling 83 and no neutral tribunal is required to
consider the weight of the evidence. The prosecution has de facto an
enormous power to determine the tenure of public officeholders,
including elected officeholders and Ministers, which effectively
nullifies the wishes of the voters. Consequently, the indictment
overcomes the presumption of innocence, and indicted officeholders
are declared unfit to hold offices of public trust.
Such an approach is contrary to the presumption of innocence,
which undermines the notion that the opinion of law enforcement
agencies should be accepted blindly, 84 and which implies that no
decision can be made regarding accused individuals’ guilt, even a
temporary one, until the end of the proceedings. 85 As Lawrence Tribe
suggests, the presumption of innocence bears a declarative and
educational message that in the absence of conviction, accused
individuals have a right to the presumption of innocence to the same
degree as the police officer who is interrogating them, the prosecutor
who is charging them, and the fact finder who is delivering the
judgment in their case. 86
Conversely, the Israeli Supreme Court heavily considered
indictment in serious crimes and declined to adopt a balancing
approach, which takes into account competing considerations, such as
the ability of the officeholders to perform their duties and the trust of
their superiors or of the public at large in their ability to perform such
duties. 87 Such a removal mechanism overlooks the affected private
and public interests. The Court’s approach can hardly be justified by
the unique characteristics of the administrative decision.

83. But cf. Larry Laudan, The Presumption of Innocence: Material or
Probatory, 11 LEGAL THEORY J. 333, 358 (2005) (The fact finder should not assume
factual innocence but should assume through the presumption of innocence that the
very charge entails no independent probatory significance).
84. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 163-64
(1968) (discussing the Due Process model’s principles).
85. William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329,
344-45 (1995).
86. Laurence H. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the
World of John Mitchell, 56 VA. L. REV. 371, 404 (1970).
87. Bendor, supra note 24, at 231, 236.
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E. The Nature of the Public Service and its Unique
Characteristics
The nature and unique characteristics of civil service may weigh
against applying the presumption of innocence to administrative
proceedings. The proper functioning of civil service is central to the
proper functioning of the state. Thus, civil service must constantly
monitor the fitness of its employees and remove the unfit ones. An
employee’s unfitness for office may result from the misdeeds
regarding criminal charges.
Moreover, ensuring public confidence in the functioning of the
civil service is of crucial importance. 88 Public confidence should
be a relevant consideration in deciding one’s continued service. Thus,
the United States Supreme Court stressed that “the State has a
significant interest in immediately suspending, when felony charges
are filed against them, employees who occupy positions of great
public trust and high public visibility, such as police officers.” 89
Allowing criminal defendants to hold office may erode public
confidence in civil service. 90 Hence, terminating their service may be
necessary to maintain public confidence in the proper functioning of
civil service and has nothing to do with their factual guilt or innocence
of the charged offenses.
II. NORMATIVE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
The presumption of innocence forbids treating individuals as
guilty based on their status as accused persons. 91 This principle serves
as a counterargument to denying the application of the presumption of
innocence in administrative proceedings. According to this view, the
presumption of innocence cannot be dislodged until granting accused
88. James K. Robinson, Restoring Public Confidence in the Fairness of the
Department of Justice’s Criminal Justice Function, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237,
241 (2008) (discussing restoring confidence in the Department of Justice).
89. Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 932 (1997).
90. Cindy Davids & Marilyn McMahon, Police Misconduct as a Breach of
Public Trust: The Offence of Misconduct in Public Office, 19 DEAKIN L. REV. 89,
89-90 (2014).
91. Kitai, supra note 50, at 292-93.
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individuals a full opportunity to defend themselves against allegations,
regardless of the strength of the incriminating evidence against
them. 92
The unfettered normative or value aspect embedded in the
presumption of innocence should accompany accused individuals in
all their interactions with the state. The state is obliged to respect the
presumption of innocence in all areas of its activity. 93 The
presumption of innocence should extend to any proceedings between
individuals and the state, especially when the state accuses an
individual of breaching the social contract and creates a conflict with
them.
Scholars call for establishing the presumption of innocence
beyond the confines of the criminal justice system, given the
significant sanctions that civil defendants face during civil trials.94
This logic certainly holds true regarding administrative proceedings
against public officeholders concerning their position, given the
interests at stake. For instance, the stigma attached to removal from
office may accompany the wrongfully accused beyond an acquittal.
Undoubtedly, the social, economic, and personal consequences
expected for a police officer by a disciplinary conviction for drug
offenses are more significant than the consequences expected for a
criminal defendant for a minor traffic offense. 95 Moreover, the main
reasons undergirding the presumption of innocence in criminal trials
are also valid in administrative proceedings that may lead to a removal
of position.
Generally, accusing individuals of committing offenses involves
ipso facto 96 antagonism between the state and the individuals, creating

92. Id. See also Mark Heerema, Uncovering the Presumption of Factual
Innocence in Canadian Law: A Theoretical Model for the Pre-Charge Presumption
of Innocence, 28 DALHOUSIE L.J. 443, 454 (2005).
93. E.g., Rosenn, supra note 45, at 545.
94. J. Harvie III Wilkinson, The Presumption of Civil Innocence, 104 VA. L.
REV. 589, 591 (2018).
95. MORTON & HUTCHISON, supra note 46, at 63 (asking rhetorically whether
the presumption of innocence in the administrative process should be ruled out in
light of the social, economic, and personal consequences expected to a police officer
by a disciplinary conviction for drug use versus the expected results to a criminal
defendant for a minor traffic offense).
96. Latin for “by the fact itself.”
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a situation of pursuit and conflict. 97 By charging individuals, the state
is blaming them for breaching the social contract and exhibits
rejection and mistrust towards them. By dint of the accusations,
individuals may feel insulted and betrayed.
The presumption of innocence forbids treating accused
individuals as criminals, alleviating the humiliation, rejection, and
alienation an accused may suffer and helps maintain the individual’s
positive identification with the community. 98 The presumption of
innocence has a therapeutic effect and should also be a key component
within the framework of therapeutic jurisprudence. 99 The feelings of
alienation and betrayal may be strongly exacerbated for indicted
public officeholders who may feel their contribution and dedication to
the state are forgotten if they are removed from their position in the
absence of conviction.
The state’s ability to inflict harm due to the disparity of powers
between the state and individuals is one justification of the
presumption of innocence. 100 This justification seeks to limit the
state’s power before an individual is convicted and has the opportunity
to challenge the evidence against them. 101 The state can damage an
97. See e.g., R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional
Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 36-37 (1981).
98. Kitai, supra note 50, at 282. See also Liz Campbell, Criminal Labels, the
European Convention on Human Rights and the Presumption of Innocence, 76
MOD. L. REV. 681, 690 (2013) (stating that the presumption of innocence
demonstrates “our commitment to a sense of community and respect for fellow
members.”).
99. E.g., David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743 (2005); Michael
Perlin, ‘God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son’: Why the Insanity Defense and the
Incompetency Status are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477 (2017); Pauline Spencer, From
Alternative to the New Normal: Therapeutic Jurisprudence in the Mainstream 39: 4
Alt. L.J 222 (2014).
100. Sybil Sharpe, Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill—The Demise of the
Presumption of Innocence, 58 J. CRIM. L. 179, 180 (1994).
101. See Carleton Kemp Allen, Legal Duties, 40 YALE L.J., 253 (1931)
(stating that the abolishment of the presumption of innocence would equip the State
with threatening powers that no person in a free country could tolerate) (emphasis
added).
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officeholder’s career through the powers vested in them, distinctly as
a political tool. 102 Thus, the presumption of innocence should extend
to indicted public officeholder when their position is at stake. Even if
no suspicion for prosecutorial abuse of power arises, removal from
office–especially despite factual innocence–magnifies the disparity of
powers. It may also create feelings of injustice, persecution, and
helplessness when one’s rights are infringed without the ability to
refute the incriminating evidence against them and demonstrate their
innocence to the public.
Human-rights law says every accused person is presumed
innocent, but ‘the people’ generally hold the suspect guilty. 103 Thus,
the presumption of innocence has been justified as a means to ensure a
fair trial by counteracting the factual presumption of guilt, which
emanates from one’s status as an accused person. 104
Discharging indicted public officeholders from their position
absent a conviction embodies a presumption of guilt, or at least
legitimizes treating them as criminals based solely on the indictment.
Lowering the evidentiary requirement to determine an indicted
officeholder’s removal from a position aggravates the danger of
harming the substantial interest of an innocent person. 105
Undoubtedly, when the very indictment drastically changes the
position of public officeholders, the conception of guilt is accelerated.
The presumption of innocence should, then, serve to combat precisely
the presumption of guilt created.
Consequently, the presumption of innocence is also justified in
administrative proceedings. The administrative body is less
committed than the judiciary in preserving individuals’ rights. Thus,
the obligation imposed on it by the presumption of innocence is
necessary to maintain the status of accused persons as innocent during
102. E.g., Rosenn, supra note 45, at 536-37 (standing on circumventing the
defense, afforded by the presumption of innocence, in the 1950s in the United
States, people suspected of being identified with the outlawed Communist Party
were fired from their jobs without being criminally charged).
103. STEPHAN TRECHSEL, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 7
(2005).
104. George P. Fletcher, The Presumption of Innocence in the Soviet Union,
15 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1214 (1968). See also RICHARD L. LIPPKE, TAMING THE
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 94-95 (2016).
105. E.g., Lindemann v. American Horse Shows Ass’n, Inc. 624 N.Y.S. 2d
723, 726 (1994).
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administrative proceedings. Therefore, a clear distinction should be
drawn between the exercise of a private employer’s rights and the
State’s duty to protect the constitutional rights of the people.
Specifically, the state must accord significance to the status of an
accused person, who holds a public office, as an innocent person.
However, the statement that the “status” of a public officeholder
should be maintained in the absence of a conviction should be
clarified. Some forms of misconduct or malpractice by public
officeholders can indicate their unfitness to hold a specific public
office. Not all misconduct meriting removal constitutes a criminal
offense. 106 The mere fact that a person was cleared of criminal
suspicion, whether they were not charged with a crime at all or were
acquitted at trial, cannot defend them from administrative decisions as
to their ability to undertake their job, code of ethics violations, or the
public trust.
Regarding removal from office, there is no reason to distinguish
between those suspected or charged with criminal offenses and those
to whom the charges against were focused only on the administrative
sphere. There is also no need to provide greater protections for the
first group of officeholders. It is possible that a public officeholder did
not act with criminal intent and therefore does not bear criminal
liability, or that the element of criminal intent was not established
beyond a reasonable doubt, but they did, nonetheless, act negligently,
contemptuously, and dishonestly. 107 Thus, given the strict standards of
conduct required from officeholders, even noncriminal conduct may
justify the removal from their position.108 Hence, the presumption of
innocence is not an obstacle to damaging a career, since the harm to
the office is not based on guilt of the criminal offense.
The presumption of innocence only protects a person in certain
circumstances. For instance, when the same evidence that was not
106. See e.g., Barry Jeffrey Stern, Revealing Misconduct by Public Officials
Through Grand Jury Reports, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 73, 125 (1988) (“This type of
report exposes violations of the public trust where evidence of wrongdoing is
qualitatively insufficient to establish a crime, and thus the grand jury is unable to
reveal the official’s misconduct by initiating a prosecution.”).
107. Id. at 75-76 (1988).
108. Id. at 137. See also Timothy Walthall, Executive Impeachment: Stealing
Fire from the Gods, 9 NEW ENG. L. REV. 257, 274 (1974).
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sufficient to establish an indictment or a criminal conviction is
sufficient to remove or suspend officeholders from their position.
Such a distinction offends the normative aspect embodied in the
presumption of innocence, which protects a person from treatment as
an offender without a conviction.
III. COMPETING INTERESTS AND THE PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE

The normative aspect of the presumption of innocence postulates
that in all cases where indicted public officeholders’ tenure does not
obstruct trial, the State should be prevented from harming their
position based on suspicions against them. Refuting the presumption
of innocence beyond any reasonable doubt is a prerequisite for
violating a person’s rights based on incriminating evidence against
them. A normative presumption of innocence prevents the State from
taking measures involving guilt against a person whose factual
innocence has not been disproved by the court. 109 Despite this
protection, there are situations in which rights are not absolute. 110
The presumption of innocence is not an absolute principle and it
can be balanced against other interests, oftentimes violating an
accused person’s rights. Pretrial detention, for instance, is accepted in
nations across the world as a necessary evil, recognizing that the harm
it causes to the presumption of innocence is balanced against other
interests. 111 Pretrial detention is one of the manifestations of
preventive detention, which “entails the incarceration of a person who
has not been convicted of a criminal offense, based on his
dangerousness, in order to prevent him from causing public harm.”112
One of the assumptions underlying pretrial detention is that accused
individuals are at serious risk of re-offending until the end of their
legal proceedings.
109. See e.g., Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 297 (1883) (Field, J. dissenting).
See also Kitai, supra note 50, at 287-88.
110. Mark D. Rosen, When Are Constitutional Rights Non-Absolute:
McCutcheon, Conflicts and the Sufficiency Question, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1535, 1573 (2015).
111. MORTON & HUTCHISON, supra note 46, at 3 (presenting the question of
an anonymous observer, “If he is presumed innocent … Why is he put in jail?”).
112. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, The Limits of Preventive Detention, 40 MCGEORGE
L. REV. 904 (2009).
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Strict adherence to an absolute presumption of innocence cannot
allow pretrial detention, even to protect public safety. Nonetheless, it
is possible to balance the presumption of innocence and to allow
pretrial detention when it is necessary to prevent grave and immediate
danger to public safety. After all, the State is also obligated to protect
public safety. 113 In those instances, the State should seriously and
honestly adhere to the rules set forth by the United States Supreme
Court according to which “in our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.” 114 Only self-defense can justify blurring the boundary
between guilt and innocence, though risking harm to individuals who
have not yet been convicted.
Similarly, certain circumstances may justify the removal of
indicted public officeholders from their position without a conviction.
The Israeli Supreme Court, for instance, has taken the position that the
weight of an indictment on corruption offenses surpasses the other
competing considerations, stating that “…as a general rule, balancing
other concerns for clean governance, rule of law, and the duty to
protect the public’s trust, the presumption of innocence is outweighed
in the context of appointment to or removal from office.” 115 Balancing
the presumption of innocence can be easier when one is not exposed
to the risk of a criminal conviction or deprivation of liberty. But
removal from office, though that may adversely affect their interests,
does not amount to punishment. 116
Against the presumption of innocence stands the significance of
the proper functioning of civil service, which is premised upon
113. Id. at 907. See Larry Laudan, The Rules of Trial, Political Morality, and
the Costs of Error: Or, is Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Doing More Harm
than Good?, 1 OXFORD STUD. IN PHIL. OF L. 195 (2011) and Alec Walen, Proof
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive Account, 76 LA. L. REV. 355
(2015), for a discussion of the State’s obligation under the social contract to protect
the people within its territory from the risk of victimization.
114. U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
115. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135, § 38 (2013)
(Isr.) (Naor, J.).
116. See e.g., Donald R. Stacy, Constitutional Right to Sentence Credit for
Pre-Trial Incarceration, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 823, 833 (1972) (for a comparison
between pre-trial and punishment).
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principles of impartiality and fairness. 117 Public officeholders are
servants of the public; they owe a fiduciary duty to the public and
should act as the public’s trustee. 118 Thus, officeholders who do
not abide by their fiduciary duties are unfit for their position.
Arguably, in cases with well-founded incriminating evidence
against an officeholder for committing offenses that impair the
functioning of civil service, a prompt response by removing them
from their position or preventing their appointment to a position is
necessary. For example, the Georgia Constitution allows the
suspension of a state officer who is indicted for a felony related to
their public office. 119 The South Carolina Constitution also allows
such action if an official is accused of a crime involving
misappropriation of public funds. 120 Indeed, in order to protect the
civil service, taking immediate action to remove an official from
office under appropriate circumstances is more important than
bringing one to justice. 121 Many times, public officeholders can even
find it difficult to function properly while under suspicion. 122
Public trust is essential for the due functioning of the civil
service. 123 As Israeli Justice Amit stressed, the cleanliness of the civil
service and the public trust derived from the image of the civil service
117. Patrick E. Longan, Civil Trial Reform and the Appearance of Fairness,
79 MARQ. L. REV. 295, 298 (1995).
118. Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Presumed Guilty: Balancing Competing Rights and
Interests in Combating Economic Crimes, 40 INT’L L. 909, 942 (2006). See also
Daphne Barak-Erez, Judicial Review of Politics: The Israeli Case, 29 J.L. & SOC’Y
611, 622 (2002); Vincent R. Johnson, The Fiduciary Obligations of Public Officials,
9 ST. MARY’S J. ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 298, 315-17 (2019).
119. Daleo, supra note 51, at 447.
120. Id.
121. Stern, supra note 106, at 125.
122. See Lindemann v. American Horse Shows Ass’n, Inc. 624 N.Y.S. 2d 723,
728 (1994) (“Certainly, a bank officer, a CIA agent, a policeman or a Judge may be
temporarily suspended (subject to reinstatement), when continued service until
cleared would taint every aspect of his or her job performance or decisionmaking.”).
123. Longan, supra note 117, at 298 (“The assumption that trust plays a key
role in the authoritativeness of government, i.e., in the willingness of citizens to
cooperate with government decisions and leaders, has been validated by research
suggesting that a lack of public support leads to a willingness to disobey the law and
to engage in anti-system behaviors such as riots.”). Cf. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v.
Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 241-43 (1988) (discussing maintaining public trust in the
bank).
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are the two cornerstones of the rule of law. 124 Public trust in the civil
service underpins the social contract, which gives legitimacy to the
exercise of the State’s powers. Abuse of public trust by officeholders
may undermine this legitimacy because the civil service would not be
able to function properly without public trust.125 Thus, a crime like
bribery threatens “…the very fabric of society” 126 and “…the very
soul of a democracy committed to equality under the law.” 127 It also
threatens the effective and honest functioning of the civil service and
may consequently undermine social stability.
Public trust in the civil service may be undermined if the public
believes that its officeholders are not honest. 128 The public can doubt
the honesty of officeholders even without a conviction. Arguably,
filing an indictment against public officeholders can breach public
trust in the honest functioning of the civil service, to the extent that
justifies and even compels their removal from their position. Thus,
when the Israeli Supreme Court ordered the prime minister to remove
the indicted Minister of Interior from his office, it reasoned that the
continuance of the public tenure of a Minister who was charged with
bribery and abuse of government office “would reflect in a farreaching manner on the image of government in Israel, and on its
good faith and integrity.” 129 Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that
litigants would not trust a judge in their case who was indicted on

124. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.
Attorney General (Supplementary Judgment) § 12 (May 27, 2020), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
125. Restoring the Public Trust: A Blueprint for Government Integrity, 18
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 173, 189 (1990) (“As bearers of the public trust, our officials
must be held to the highest standards of behavior. When they falter, they not only
betray their responsibilities to the citizens of our State, but they encourage us to do
the same to each other.”) [hereinafter Restoring the Public Trust].
126. Maria Simon, Bribery and Other Not So Good Behavior: Criminal
Prosecution as a Supplement to Impeachment of Federal Judges, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1617, 1638-39 (1994) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 139 (1983)).
127. Amar, supra note 6, at 302.
128. HIRAM MILLER STOUT, PUBLIC SERVICE IN GREAT BRITAIN 149 (1938).
129. HCJ 3094/93 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v. State of
Israel 47(5) PD 404, § 18 (1993) (Isr.).
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bribery and may be reluctant to continue the litigation until the final
verdict in the criminal case.
Moreover, the fiduciary duty that public officeholders owe to the
public compels stricter standards of behavior than required by the
criminal law. 130 Public officeholders who have been entrusted with
prominent public functions should serve as an example to the
public. 131 Some believe, therefore, that it is undue for someone to
serve in a public office, which requires them to meet certain standards
of conduct, when there is incriminating evidence against them.132
Thus, Article III, section 1, of the United States Constitution provides,
“(t)he judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
offices during good behavior…” 133
Public officeholders should discharge their duties during poor
behavior and should inspire trust in the public by their good behavior.
It is doubtful, however, whether requiring good character or behavior
grants a legal basis for a judicial order to remove appointed, let alone
elected, officeholders from their position without a conviction. 134
Furthermore, former Israeli Chief Justice Grunis held
there was no evidence to conclude that public trust in certain public
officers was impaired due to their indictment and asked, “What better
way to test the public’s trust than direct elections for the office of head
of local authority, when it is widely known that the candidate is facing

130. Stern, supra note 106, at 107; Restoring the Public Trust, supra note 125,
at 229.
131. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.
Attorney General (Supplementary Judgment) § 2 (Fogelman, J.) (May 27, 2020),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.); Kathleen V. Buffon,
Removal for Cause from the Civil Service: The Problem of Disproportionate
Discipline, 28 AM. U. L. REV. 207, 207 (1979) (“An employee in the United States
civil service is held to an exemplary standard of conduct.”).
132. See HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.
Attorney General (Supplementary Judgment) § 3 (Barak-Erez, J.) (May 27, 2020),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) (stating that on the sphere
of public law, filing an indictment carries implications that cast a shadow on the
tenure of a public officeholder).
133. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
134. See Dotan, supra note 29, at 726-28. Cf Paul Taylor, Congress’s Power
to Regulate the Federal Judiciary: What the First Congress and the First Federal
Courts Can Teach Today’s Congress and Courts, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 847, 894-903
(2010).
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criminal prosecution?” 135 Justice Grunis added that “the ‘public’s
trust’ can be measured empirically through elections, when it is
expected that one of the major issues in the elections would be the
indictment.” 136 If the voters know about the candidate’s indictment
and nevertheless elect them for city mayor, their vote clearly indicates
their trust in the indicted candidate.
Thus, when Benjamin
Netanyahu’s party successfully gained the support of the majority of
Knesset members it implied that the public does in fact consider and
trust him to be fit for office. As Justice Solberg stressed, despite the
suspicions against Benjamin Netanyahu, many people respect him and
appreciate his work and achievements. 137 Indeed, as the President’s
request of the Knesset Members demonstrated, the Israeli public
ultimately accorded Benjamin Netanyahu its trust to lead the state.
For those who emphasize public trust in the civil service, the
critical question in allowing criminal defendants to hold public office
is not the empirical question of whether public trust in the civil service
is actually impaired, but rather the normative question of whether
public trust should be impaired considering the moral values expected
from officeholders. While some Justices stressed that the public and
the Knesset Members were clearly aware of the pending indictment
against Netanyahu, 138 Justice Mazuz expressed that “the reality in
which a criminal accused forms a government and leads it reflects a
social crisis and moral failure of society and of Israel’s political
system.” 139 Justice Kara sharply reckoned that a Knesset Member
indicted on serious crimes does not deserve to form a government and
to serve as prime minister, and it is appropriate, from a public
perspective, that he would not run for office at all. 140

135. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135, § 1 (2013)
(Isr.) (Grunis, J.).
136. Id. § 10.
137. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.
Attorney General (Supplementary Judgment) § 4 (Solberg, J.), (May 27, 2020),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
138. Id. § 16-17 (Mintz, J.), § 7-8 (Handel, J.).
139. Id. § 1 (Mazuz, J.).
140. Id. § 1 (Kara, J.).
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While the Israeli Supreme Court recognized that realities of life
may cause the public to wish to be represented by a person who is not
a role model of proper behavior, 141 it also clarified in 2013 that public
trust in elected officials and the will of the voters does not necessarily
prevail or immune the officials from judicial removal. Thus, the Israeli
Supreme Court clarified it would not establish a rule that led to
corruption (according to which the will of the voters to elect
individuals indicted with serious offenses trumps the great harm to
clean governance, the fundamentals of democracy, and the rule of law
created in such a situation). 142 The Court held that filing an indictment
for serious offenses against clean governance would result in the
removal of elected mayors from office even if they are
reelected. 143 By ruling that the will of the voters is not determinative
and could not trump other relevant considerations, the Israeli Supreme
Court declined, then, to examine public trust through an empirical
lens.
But even assuming that public trust in the proper functioning of
the public service is violated, and that this breach of trust is
detrimental to its functioning, public trust by itself is not a sufficient
justification for harming innocent people. 144
To the contrary, Justice Arbel believed that refraining from
removing indicted public officeholders from their position conveys
messages of disregard for the rule of law, disrespect for the work of
law enforcement agencies, disrespect of the prosecution’s decision to
file an indictment, and “expresses concession to a reality where
breaking the law is no longer cause for scorn and shunning.” 145 Such
141. A.S.S. (Appeal of the State Service) 4123/95, Orr v. State of Israel –
State Service Ombudsman, 49(5) PD 184, 190 (1996) (Isr.).
142. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135, § 57-58
(2013) (Isr.) (Naor, J.).
143. Id.
144. See Lindemann v. American Horse Shows Ass’n, Inc. 624 N.Y.S.2d 723,
725 (1994) (“(P)ublic reaction to a scandal, especially one involving persons of
prominence and leadership, puts to a real test all our vaunted principles about the
presumption of innocence, for the stronger the public revulsion, the greater the
demand to ‘do something,’ even before all the facts can be fully aired.”).
145. HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social Justice in
Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135, § 7-8 (2013)
(Isr.) (Arbel, J.).
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messages, however, clearly undermine the presumption of innocence.
The public trust should not come at the expense of a person who is
considered innocent. The presumption of innocence should regulate
people’s conduct and disallow addressing people as criminals before
their guilt has been proven. Adhering to these principles also
guarantees ensuring trust and respect towards the civil service.
Ignoring the presumption of innocence could empirically and
normatively corrode public trust. 146
A position that considers public trust as an independent factor that
could result in the removal of public officeholders from their position
should not be accepted. The public trust by itself should not label a
person as a criminal without a conviction, even if the majority of the
public believes in the criminal guilt of a public officeholder and that,
as a result, its trust in the civil service is severely corroded. Said
differently, public opinion should not take away from the State’s
burden to prove guilt in a criminal court.
However, akin to preventive detention, removal or suspension of
public officeholders from their position before their guilt has been
established may be justified by a clear danger posed by an
officeholder committing additional crimes that would adversely affect
the functioning of the civil service. The State has a commitment to the
public to serve it with fairness and integrity, which justifies viewing a
serious danger to the proper functioning of the civil service as a
situation akin to self-defense, sufficient to violate the presumption of
innocence. In any other situation, however, the presumption of
innocence should be accorded full validity to protect an accused’s
interests, including a public officeholder whose position is at stake.
Here, too, it can be argued that the civil service cannot function
properly when the continued office holding casts serious doubt on the
integrity and honesty of the civil service, given the impact of
accusations of corruption on public trust and the need of public trust
for providing legitimacy to the civil service. Public trust in the civil
service, however, may be undermined regardless of whether the
146. R. v. Hall, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 309, § 102 (Can.) (“I am at a loss to
comprehend how pre-trial detention…could possibly promote confidence in the
administration of justice in the mind of an informed public fully aware of the
importance of the presumption of innocence at trial.”). See also GARY TROTTER,
THE LAW OF BAIL IN CANADA 94 (1992).
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offense is connected to the officeholder’s position; whether or not
there is a real danger to the functioning of the civil service; and
whether or not the public officeholder was convicted or acquitted at
trial. The rebuttal of the presumption of innocence should not be
shifted from the court to the public yard.
The question of whether continued office holding may harm the
civil service should be determined by the voters and the regular
democratic process. The Israeli Supreme Court enforced its own
norms on the public regarding the ineligibility of indicted elected
officeholders such as city mayors and Ministers to hold office. The
Court refrained to cross the line of the separation of powers when it
comes to the power of the Knesset to determine the identity of the
head of the state. However, the voter’s wishes should be honored
regarding all types of elected officeholders. The reality in Israel
demonstrated that a great part of the public does respect the
presumption of innocence and is fully aware of the distinction
between indictment and conviction.
CONCLUSION
Applying the presumption of innocence to administrative
proceedings is consistent with the broad view of this presumption. The
broad view does not limit the presumption of innocence to preconviction punishment or to the allocation of the burden of proof at
trial. Rather, it extends the protection to other forms of harm by the
state, which could express guilt towards someone based on their status
as an accused.
Before making a decision to file an indictment that could
adversely affect the position of a public officeholder, the outcome of
the trial should be clarified and the presumption of innocence should
be given full regard. However, akin to detaining accused persons
pretrial to protect public safety, public officeholders’ position can be
damaged in a situation involving immediate and grave danger to the
functioning of the civil service by the continued office holding.
The decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court to ban office holding
by defendants in serious crimes on clean governance embody a
presumption of guilt. The Israeli Supreme Court has not extended this
ban to the case of assigning an indicted individual with the task of
forming a government. The Court has declined to so boldly infringe
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the will of the voters. 147 However, the Court dismissed the
significance of the presumption of innocence by clarifying that a
public officeholder cannot use the presumption of innocence as
protection against removal from their position or against preventing
new appointments. 148
Nevertheless, the presumption of innocence is a general principle
that should prevent addressing accused people as criminals before
establishing their guilt. This principle should also be applicable to
indicted public officeholders. Generally, a criminal conviction should
be necessary for the removal from office and for preventing
appointments due to the commission of criminal offenses.
Regarding ministers and city mayors, the Israeli Supreme Court
has previously granted enormous power to the prosecution by ordering
that the very indictment on serious offenses is sufficient for removal
from office, preventing appointments, and violating the right to elect
and to be elected. 149 The Supreme Court refrained from granting this
power to the prosecution regarding the prime minister. 150
The case of Benjamin Netanyahu indicates that the public respects
the presumption of innocence and, through its vote, conveys the
message that law enforcement agencies should not influence the
ability of an individual to hold the office of prime minister absent a
conviction. The voters expressed their confidence in the leadership of
Netanyahu (at least by the time of the third elections) and their
willingness to be protected by him rather than from him. Indeed, in the
absence of a conviction, a continuance of the holding of offices
expresses respect to the presumption of innocence and to the notion
that only the fact finder at trial can declare guilt.
Since the previous rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court have not
directly addressed imposing the task of forming a government on an
indicted Knesset Member, this provides an opportunity to restore and
147. HCJ 2592/20 The Movement for Quality Government in Israel v.
Attorney General § 17 (May 12, 2020), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in
Hebrew) (Isr.).
148. See HCJ 4921/13 Citizenship for Proper Administration and Social
Justice in Israel v. Mayor of Ramat Hasharon, Yitzhak Rochberger 66(3) PD 135
(2013) (Isr.).
149. Id. § 1 (Grunis, J.).
150. Id. § 41 (Naor, J.).
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honor the presumption of innocence as a paradigm of criminal law.
The presumption of innocence alone cannot fully protect individuals
against the consequences that accompany an investigation or trial. It
does not prevent pre-trial publicity or the public’s preconceived
notions regarding someone’s guilt or innocence. But legal rules do
convey a message; they can inhibit the tendency to judge an accused
before their conviction and can accelerate the respect towards the
presumption of innocence.
Here, reality disproved the public trust argument as justification
for the removal of public officeholders, which was also problematic in
previous rulings. It cannot be overlooked that the Likud, the political
party of the prime minister who was indicted with bribery and breach
of trust, received the most votes and that the majority of Knesset
Members accepted (whether willingly or as a necessary evil) this
leadership. 151
A large portion of the public declined to treat the indicted prime
minister as a convicted person and the Supreme Court refrained from
taking steps that assume guilt, like preventing him from forming a
government. This illustrates the presumption of innocence rightfully
receiving proper respect.
It may be that the public cares more about the agenda and
achievements of the prime minister than his moral behavior. The
public, however, has struck the balance between the significance of
the indictment and the competing interests, and has accorded the
presumption of innocence its normative role as protection of accused
people against the violation of their pre-trial rights without compelling
reasons.

151. Wootliff, supra note 7.
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